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Abstract
This paper analyses ﬁscal performance in terms of own-revenue collection and sustainability
of local municipalities in South Africa. Criteria such as gross value added, revenue collected from
own sources, debtors outstanding, the ageing of debt and dependency on grants are considered.
The conclusion is that a large number of municipalities do not comply with the requirement
that a “reasonable” amount of current expenditures be ﬁnanced by means of own resources.
Furthermore, local government ﬁnances are featured by substantial variance as far as collection
of own income is concerned. While close to half of them ﬁnance more than 50 percent of their
current expenditures from own resources, about one third are largely dependent on grants from
upper spheres of government and generate less than 20 percent of current expenditures from
own resources. As a whole, the ﬁscal sustainability of the local government sector, given the
current scenario of ﬂows, is a reason for concern. In order to comply with international criteria
for solid ﬁscal performance, a number of municipalities will have to improve their performance
with regard to own-revenue collection.
The reason for this phenomenon seems to be the problem of “soft budgets” and an historic
dependence on grants to ﬁnance not only capital expenditures but also most, if not all of, cur-
rent expenditures. Due to historical and political factors, local governments in South Africa
diﬀer substantially in terms of potential revenue base, but it may be that in many cases po-
tential revenue is not exploited and that the high level of dependency on grants is the result of
ineﬃciency and lack of political will to be more self-reliant. In view of the wide-spread protest
actions against poor quality of service delivery at the local government level, ﬁscal authorities
should take a fresh look at the extent to which these governments are accountable for being
more ﬁnancially independent. This would help prevent the accumulation of debt as a result of
growing backlogs in service payments.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The series of protest actions by local communities have sparked a renewed debate about the ef-
fectiveness of service delivery at especially the third sphere of government in South Africa. The
relevant literature is featured by a great number of articles arguing the merit for more or less de-
centralisation in order to improve the quality of service delivery. This article analyses one aspect
of this issue, namely the shorter- and longer-term ﬁnancial capability of local governments of being
more self-reliant in ﬁnding ﬁnancial resources to provide for the needs of their constituencies.
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1In his budget speech on 22 April 2010, the Minister of the Department of Cooperative Governance
and Traditional Aﬀairs, Mr S Shiceka, also raised concern about the apparent disjuncture between
expenditures and the revenue base of local governments when he commented as follows:
“One of the key observations is that the intergovernmental ﬁs c a lr e l a t i o n si sb a s e do no u t -
dated approaches wherein the baseline used for ﬁnancing of municipalities is not aligned
to their income, revenue base and the tasks at hand” (Budget vote 2010/11 speech, p 1).
Although it is accepted that municipalities diﬀer widely with regard to their potential revenue
base due to, for example, historical and political reasons, a high dependency on grants could aﬀect the
enthusiasm with which local governments exploit own-revenue sources. In this regard local revenue
simply becomes an extension of the national government’s budget, but without the strict control
over expenditures at this level. Furthermore, it could create problems such as the “ﬂypaper eﬀect”
as explained by Oates (2008: 324). According to this view, grants may provide for a far greater
stimulus to public expenditure than an equal increase in revenue from own resources. This raises
concern about the responsiveness of local oﬃcials to the needs of the electorate, with expenditures
being allocated according to their own objectives. In addition, high levels of grant dependency could
therefore also promote ﬁscal irresponsibility and even instability at the national government level
(Amusa, et.al., 2008).
In addition to the concern about the allocation of funds, the lack of accountability of local
government oﬃcials has also been identiﬁed as a main contributor to a greater amount of grants
dependency. This is known as the “soft budget” problem, where local governments overspend based
on expectations that grants from central government will increase concomitantly. There is therefore
little need to explore possibilities regarding the collection of more own resources. Furthermore, in
some cases corrupt oﬃcials are empowered to provide ﬁscal incentives to individuals and projects
of their choice through rent-seeking practices. Such oﬃcials/politicians are not accountable because
of such “soft budgets”, meaning that they expect central government to bail them out should their
budgets not balance because of overspending. Oates (2008: 324) refers to this behaviour as the
“raiding of the ﬁscal commons”. Thus, the lack of clear targets regarding own resources creates a
culture of transfer dependency. This tendency is not uncommon in South Africa and the following
warning by Canuto and Liu should be taken seriously:
The deterioration in primary balance is driven by declining revenues combined with ex-
penditure rigidity or continuing expenditures. In general, countries’ ﬁscal needs are rising
but ﬁscal space is narrowing, resulting in deteriorating ﬁscal positions across regions and
tiers of the government. (World Bank Economic Premise, no.13, May 2010).
Although the literature is unclear as to what a “reasonable” level of own funding means, this
paper aims at deﬁning such a level by analysing the level of dependency of local governments in
South Africa. The results seem to provide guidelines as to what such “reasonable margins” could
be for categorisation and appropriate policy adjustment. These margins are assumed to be aligned
with what Bird (see Oates, 2008: 326) has termed a “solid system of local tax”.
It should be noted that this paper does not deal with the institutional design of local government
ﬁnance in South Africa and therefore possible deﬁciencies in this regard have not been considered.
Rather, it is assumed that the structure and institutional outlay of the diﬀerent levels of government
in South Africa are themselves endogenous and simply a function of the historic political decision-
making processes. In many instances the design of these institutions has been the result of decisions
to address political problems and not so much the result of a proper investigation into what is
economically viable and ﬁscally sustainable.
Momoniat (2001: 2) outlined a number of shortcomings in local government ﬁnance in South
Africa. Some of the most relevant issues include the following (numbers have been updated according
to latest data available):
21. Increasing reliance of municipalities on transfers from national government to fund their ac-
tivities, due to a lack of own-revenue eﬀort and a lack of commitment to leverage private
funding.
2. The outstanding debtors of municipalities for which data is available amounted to US$ 3,7
billion in the 2009/10 ﬁscal year compared to US$ 3,4 billion in the 2007/08 ﬁscal year (an
average increase of 10,9 percent per annum if the exchange rate eﬀect is excluded).
3. Actual expenditure by all categories of municipalities had been increasing annually by 13,3
per cent from US$ 11,4 billion in 2003/04 to US$ 24,1 billion in 2009/10. This increase far
exceeded the inﬂation rate and represents a sharp increase in real expenditures.
4. Low levels of expenditure on repairs and maintenance due to the ease with which these expen-
ditures can be deferred in favour of new capital projects or other operating costs. Two factors
appear to underlie this problem. First, the under-pricing of municipal services relative to their
true cost of delivery, including maintenance costs, and secondly, poor management practices
in municipalities.
5. Poor quality of data on provincial transfers to local government. Some provinces are not con-
sistently gazetting their municipal allocations and it is safe to assume that they transfer larger
amounts than what they are publishing. The fact that provincial transfers to municipalities
have not been consistent is an indication of uncertainty on the part of provinces in relation to
their planning, which in turn makes it diﬃcult for municipalities to plan for this funding.
6. Weak co-ordination between programs. The overall implication is that transfers are not yet
reaching their potential in terms of comprehensively supporting economic growth and poverty
alleviation.
7. Programs to strengthen the capacity of municipalities remain fragmented and are diﬃcult to
evaluate. This is a signiﬁcant problem, given concern about capacity constraints in municipal-
ities.
8. Probably one of the most serious problems at local government level is the proportionally high
ratio of salaries to total operating expenditures (28,4 percent in the case of Metros and 35
percent in the case of Category B municipalities for which data is available). According to
Momoniat the challenges faced by the municipalities at the lower end of the spectrum relate
primarily to persistently high vacancy rates, which are greatly aggravated by poor management
and poor governance.
Casual analysis of the current data base reﬂects the concerns expressed by Momoniat. For
example, 75 percent of debtors outstanding are in excess of 90 days while debtor information is not
available for all municipalities. Consumer debt is therefore on the increase and large amounts had
to be written oﬀ over the past few years. Little evidence exists with regard to targets set for own
funding of at least current expenditures and the data shows a large degree of variance in terms of
the generation of own funds. This own-revenue problem is also raised by Amusa and Mathahane
(2007) who note:
”...attention needs to be paid to addressing problems relating to the collection of incomes
due from available revenue sources...” (SA Journal of Economics: 273). The authors
also point out the fact that transfers to local governments feature a number of problems
hindering the eﬀective implementation of conditional grant-funded programs. In this
regard the fragmented disbursement mechanisms and the lack of co-ordination between
policy and budgeting units seem to undermine service delivery and create confusion
regarding accountability/responsibility (SAJE: 283).
3Against the backdrop of the issues raised, an attempt is made to review the capacity/eﬃciency
of local governments in South Africa to collect own revenue and also to measure the impact of
current local ﬁnancing policies in terms of ﬁscal sustainability. It should be noted that welfare gains
fall outside the scope of this paper. In order to measure such gains/losses it would be necessary
to quantify the variation in demand for local services across jurisdictions and in diﬀering costs
of providing these services (Oates: 2008, 317). One would expect that welfare gains would vary
directly with the magnitude of the variation and inversely with the price elasticity of demand for
such services. However, given the lack of relevant data this has not been possible.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the data
used while section 3 outlines the variances in revenue collection capacity. Section 4 analyses the
concept “ﬁscal sustainability” at local government level and section 5 concludes with some policy
suggestions.
2D a t a
Local government revenue data are largely limited to the data published by the South African
National Treasury (Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review, various issues).It would
have been more correct to work with audited data (Auditor-General) but given the time lags, and
in many cases the non-availability of such data, this has not been possible. Despite the fact that
a comprehensive set of ﬁscal data on local government is available from National Treasury, many
municipalities still fail to report crucial information such as debtors outstanding as well as revenue
from all sources of income. In addition to this, only a limited number of municipalities report the
age of their outstanding debtors. Even where they do report, qualiﬁed audit opinions based on poor
internal controls renders this information suspect.
Therefore, the analysis in this paper is based largely on monetary stocks and ﬂows related to
revenue. Where possible, indicators are expressed in per capita terms, with population ﬁgures mostly
based on the 2001 census ﬁgures as reported by National Treasury.
3 Own-Revenue Financing
The data shows that on average, local governments collect only a relatively small portion of revenue
from own resources and have little or no borrowing power to fund deﬁcits (except in the case of
metros). Casual empirical analysis of relevant variables revealed some interesting results. Table 1
shows a list of category B municipalities collecting more than 15 percent of Gross Value Added (GVA)
in their particular areas. It should be noted that 2004 GVA is used as a proxy for regional GDP
since it is the only related ﬁgure available (www.treasury/mfma/publications). Revenue includes
charges on the sale of services such as electricity and water, etc., own funding and external loans,
but excluding subsidies and grants used to ﬁnance both operational and capital expenditures. From
the total of 237 municipalities in category B, only 43 collect more than 15 percent of GVA from own
sources and loans in their areas.
It is also interesting to note that there does not seem to be any correlation between the level at
which income is generated by means of the sale of services and loans and the size of the population.
In other words, some small municipalities manage to achieve relatively high collection rates from
GVA, while some large municipalities fair much worse in this regard. Kingwini for example, is at the
top of the list, with a population of only 94 047, while Buﬀalo City is at the lower end of the table,
collecting only 16 per cent of GVA, with a population of 803 448. At the bottom end of the scale, 56
municipalities collect less than 5 percent of GVA. The reasons for this variance are not quite clear
but it is suspected that ﬁnancial procedures that aﬀect the culture of payment for service charges
and a lack of service provision might be some of the most important explanations.
4The implication of this is that municipalities, in general, largely rely on subsidies and grants
to ﬁnance not only capital expenditures but also operational expenditures (see Table 2). In the
case of 15 municipalities, grants and subsidies exceeded total expenditures, while in 28 other cases
grants and subsidies ﬁnance more than 80 percent of total expenditures. In fact, in the case of
107 municipalities (category B), subsidies and grants ﬁnance more than 50 percent of their current
expenditures. However, this also means that 130 municipalities manage to fund up to 50 percent of
their current expenditures from own resources. In fact Table 3 shows that 50 of the 237 municipalities
(category B) manage to fund less than 20 percent of their current expenditures by means of grants
and subsidies. The best performer here is Umhlathuze, which ﬁnances only about 7 per cent of its
current expenditures from grants and subsidies. It is interesting to note that 11 of the municipalities
on this list also appear on the National Treasury’s list of “top 20” municipalities.
In addition to grants and subsidies, the main sources of revenue comprise property rates and
service charges on the distribution of electricity, water, sewerage and sanitation. Furthermore, Table
3 shows that property taxes and service charges on the sales of electricity and water account for about
85 percent of total revenue. The balance consists of a combination of donations and contributions
which adds up to 5 percent, while the other 10 percent is generated by other sources of revenue.
Thus, the bulk of total revenue is raised from service charges and grants, with a fair amount being
raised from property taxes. The relatively high standard deviations of the three variables indicate
though that the size of the proportion of revenue generated by a speciﬁc source of income varies
quite substantially from one municipality to another.
Figure 1 shows the plot of the logarithm values of per capita revenue from the sale of services
and the logarithm values of per capita GVA by municipalities for which a full data set is available1.
The ﬁgure shows an almost linear correlation between GVA and revenue collected (see Table 7 for
statistical results) in the form of service charges, up until the turning point at approximately US$ 4
900 ((exp(10.65)/8.58=US$4 912)). Thus, if the per capita GVA of the municipal area is below US$
4 900, the per capita revenue of the municipality grows at close to 1 per cent for each percentage
increase in the per capita GVA and tapers oﬀ where the GVA of the municipality exceeds US$ 4 900.
The intuition behind this phenomenon is that as the per capita GVA of a municipality increases,
income also rises with a concomitant increase in the demand for services in all those municipalities
where the per capita GVA is lower than the upper turning point in the ﬁgure. This turning point
could be regarded as the level at which the municipality has reached a “matured” status, where
the majority of consumers have access to the desired levels of water and electricity supply in that
municipality.
From an eﬃciency point of view it is important to look at the diﬀerence in the ratios of revenue
collected from service charges and the GVA of a municipality. In other words, to what extent do
they succeed in raising revenue from the potential income base they have? An analysis of the data
shows a substantial level of variance between municipalities (See Figure 2). The hypothesis is that
the larger the ratio of the per capita revenue of the municipality relative to its per capita GVA, the
more eﬃcient the municipality is in generating own resources. It should be noted that this can only
be true in the case where municipalities have not reached “maturity” and therefore only those to
the left of the turning point have been included in the ratio analysis. The two lines at the top and
bottom of the plot represent the 99 per cent conﬁdence intervals of the distribution, and the shaded
area the 99 per cent conﬁdence limits of the mean of the distribution.
In order to compare, municipalities are categorised based on the mean revenue/GVA ratio. Those
above the mean are regarded as more eﬃcient than those below the mean. Since the observations
close to the mean (within the 99 per cent conﬁdence intervals of the mean of the distribution) are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from it, these ones have been classiﬁed as “moderately successful”. Those
above the 99 per cent conﬁdence limit are classiﬁed as “most successful” and those below it as “less
successful”. The spread of the classiﬁed municipalities is shown in Figure 3. The revenue/GVA
1The author would like to acknowledge the inputs of Mr. Roland Du Plessis, Masters student at the University of
Pretoria, who computed the data for the analysis.
5ratios of the “less successful” ones range from 0.021 to 0.051, while the “most successful” ones range
from 0.82 to 0.143.
The municipalities as classiﬁed are listed in tables 5a-5c. In Table 5a the “more successful” ones
(34 or 51 per cent of the total in this data base) have been sorted from high to low in terms of GVA
in US dollars. At the top of the list is Knysna with GVA per capita of US$4 881 and revenue per
capita of US$488, which is third largest on the list. Table 5b contains the municipalities classiﬁed
as “marginally successful” with their ratios within the 95 per cent conﬁdence levels of the mean
ratio. From the list it can be seen that although the GVA per capita ﬁgures are not lower than
in the case of Table 5a, the per capita revenue per GVA is lower. Approximately 20 per cent of
municipalities fall into this category. Finally the “less successful” municipalities are listed in Table
5c. It is interesting to note that municipalities such as Swellendam, Swartland, Cederburg, with a
relatively high GVA per capita, are included in this group since their per capita revenue is as low as
US$ 239, 243, and 189, respectively. At the bottom of the list is Elundini with a low GVA of US$
291 and per capita revenue of only US$11. The latter group comprises 32 per cent of the total.
This outcome is meaningful. The comparison is between each municipality relative to its own
GVA base. It can therefore not be argued that the ones below the mean ratio perform poorly just
because of their disadvantaged position regarding economic activity in the area. In fact, the ﬁgures
show that some municipalities with a relatively low level of per capita GVA outperform others with
a relatively high GVA per capita. For example, Sakhisizwe with a per capita GVA of only US$ 491
performs much more superior in ratio terms than Swellendam, with a per capita GVA as high as
US$ 4 624. The structure of the economy in the area regarding the demand for municipal services
matters, but ﬁnancial discipline and motivation, together with skills levels, probably also play a
major role.
The next section provides a futuristic view of the stance of ﬁscal aﬀairs at local government level
in South Africa given the ﬁnancial ﬂows as described hitherto.
4 Fiscal Sustainability of the Local Government Sector in
South Africa
Blanchard (see Burger, 2001: 14) deﬁnes ﬁscal sustainability as whether or not the current course
of ﬁscal policy can be sustained without public debt exploding or imploding. Thus, in order to be
sustainable, revenue should match expenditures from an intertemporal perspective. However, given
its dependence on grants, local government sustainability does not seem to be an issue. Although
grants and expenditures are debated in great detail and outstanding municipal consumer debt also
receives attention, the ﬁscal sustainability of a local government is not discussed in public docu-
ments. Grants are based on the equitable-share formula and budgeted for by national and provincial
government given the status quo as far as own funding is concerned. The question is then what the
ﬁscal sustainability implications would be of a rule that prescribes a minimum level of dependence
on own funds (to protect the national budget) despite the increasing demand for municipal services
in years to come. Such a scenario is simulated by means of a cap on grants used to ﬁnance cur-
rent expenditures (maximum of 50 percent) based on the performance of almost half of category B
municipalities included in the analysis.
Schoeman (2006: 117) argues that municipal ﬁscal sustainability in South Africa is under pres-
sure. From a sample of 27 municipalities, it was found that the average revenue collection period is
in the range of 150 days and that the lag is on the increase. This translates directly into liquidity
problems, increased short-term loans, deﬁcits and the accumulation of long-term debt. Another key
ﬁnding of the paper is that the number of debtors in the sample and the provision for bad debt
are on the increase as well. Even though operating revenue increases, expenditure growth exceeds
revenue growth. As a result the dependence on short-term loans and government grants are on the
increase in many cases. Due to insuﬃc i e n td a t ai tw a sn o tp o s s i b l et od oas i m i l a re x e r c i s ei nt h i s
6paper, but an attempt will be made to measure sustainability using the conventional methodology
for national government debt. However, in order to do this, conventional concepts such as deﬁcit
and debt had to adjusted, to suit the scenario for local government ﬁnances. Therefore, the concept
“debt” in this model not only includes accumulated municipal deﬁcits and outstanding principle
together with interest payments, but also consumer debt owed by service users. Although somewhat
ﬁctitious, it serves as a proxy for the ability of local governments to be sustainable in the longer
term.
Furthermore, in the model the concept “deﬁcit” is adjusted to allow for overspending in each
ﬁnancial year based on capped grants at a ratio of 50 percent of current expenditures. This is
necessary in view of the problem of “soft budgets” referred to before, which means that deﬁcits
are simply ﬁnanced by means of transfers and therefore do not matter much in a local government
framework. The cap of 50 per cent on current expenditure has been chosen arbitrarily based on
the fact that close to half of municipalities comply with this norm as described earlier on. Thus,
the “deﬁcit” of each municipality is adjusted to include the balance left if grants are capped at a
maximum of 50 percent of current expenditures. The model assumes that such a deﬁcit accumulates
into debt, which has to be repaid together with interest as if borrowed from government or the
private sector. From a budget perspective this “debt” will have to be provided for by the national
government, possibly in the form of an addition to the contingency reserves that are budgeted
for. An analysis of the data shows a close correlation between outstanding debtors and the age
of outstanding debt. In fact, in the case of debt older than 90 days, in which case the debt will
probably have to be written oﬀ, the correlation is about 95 percent. In other words about all debt
accumulated will not be recovered. The reasons for this phenomenon are not clear and have not been
analysed in this paper. However, it is suspected that ﬁnancial discipline which aﬀects the ageing of
the debt, together with skills levels and eﬃciency of governance that aﬀect ﬁscal eﬀort, have much
to do with it.
The model used is based on the conventional Uctum and Wickens model (see Jacobs et. al., 2002:
550) with the variables “deﬁcit” and “debt” as adjusted. Unfortunately, outstanding consumer debt
ﬁgures (debt older than 90 days) have not been available for all municipalities and this was dealt
with by awarding all those for which data is not available, the average of available data. Using these
adjustments, total outstanding municipal “debt” in 2009/10 amounted to US$ 2 617 million in the
case of metros and US$ 2 717 million in the case of category B municipalities (a total of US$ 5 334
million).
As in the previous analysis in section 3, the GVA data published by National Treasury (2004)
is used as a proxy for regional income. Since ﬁscal needs are often driven by demographic factors,
the latter have been captured by expressing values in per capita terms. In this analysis the critical
issue reﬂected in the dynamics of the debt is the change in the outstanding debt as a result of
changes in local ﬁscal policy, the eﬃciency of local governance in terms of revenue collection and
national variables such as interest rates, inﬂation and growth in GVA. From an inter-temporal point
of view, it is argued that ﬁscal policy is sustainable when the local government sector’s aggregated
budget constraint holds in present value terms. Thus, the current debt should be oﬀset by the sum
of expected future discounted budget surpluses (discounting a cap regarding dependency on grants
and subsidies).
In the model the municipal intertemporal budget constraint can be written in nominal terms as:
Gt − Tt + iBt−1 = ∆Bt (1)
where G is municipal spending on goods and services, T is municipal revenue, B is the value of the
municipal debt outstanding, at period t1, i is the interest rate on municipal debt. The debt in year
t is equal to the diﬀerence between spending and revenue for year t, plus the sum of the outstanding
debt and the interest cost thereon. To separate the impact of the interest rate, G does not include
interest payments on municipal debt, since it is accounted for in the term itBt−1. Expressing (1) in
terms of ratios to nominal GVA gives:
7gt − τt +( I − Πt − ηt)bt−1 = ∆bt (2)
where the lower-case letters g, τ, and b, denote the ratio of the corresponding upper-case variables
to nominal GVA (Y), Πt=( P t-Pt−1)/Pt−1 and ηt=(Yt-Yt−1)/Yt−1, with P and Y representing the
price level and real GVA respectively. Thus, Equation (2) can be rewritten as:
dt + ρtbt−1 = ∆bt (3)
where dt=gt − τt is the primary local government deﬁcit expressed as a proportion of nominal
GGP/GVA and ρt=it − Πt+ηt is the real ex post interest rate adjusted for real output growth.
Equation (3) is an identity, which holds ex post in time t. Looking forward, the identity can only
hold in ex ante terms.
T h u s ,i np e r i o dt + 1 ,
bt=Et[(1 + ρt+1)−1(bt+1 − dt+1)] (4)
where bt is known in period t, and for the one-period budget constraint to hold in expectational
terms, must equal the expected discounted net debt/GVA ratio in period t+1, conditional on infor-
mation at time t.
In order for ﬁscal policy to be sustainable for one period in the future, equation (4) must hold.
The corresponding expression for n periods ahead is obtained by solving forward and successively
substituting the future compound discounted debt/GVA ratio to give the n-period intertemporal
budget constraint:








(1 + ρt+s)−1 (6)








Thus, the present stock of debt is equal to the sum of the present value of future primary surpluses
p l u st h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h es t o c ko fd e b ti ny e a r“ n”.
From an intertemporal budget constraint point of view, local governments would be solvent if
t h ep r e s e n ts t o c ko fd e b tw e r ee q u a lt ot h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fa l lf u t u r ep r i m a r ys u r p l u s e s . T h u s ,
a necessary condition for sustainability is that as n moves to inﬁnity, the discounted value of the
expected debt/GVA ratio converges to zero. This is also known as the transversality condition,
meaning that no new debt is issued to meet interest payments.
With ρ> 1, it is assumed that real interest rates will exceed real growth rates over the period
t+n. Using equation 3 and assuming unchanged ﬁscal policy behaviour, but with a cap of 50 percent
on current expenditure ﬁnanced from grants and subsidies, the “debt” of metros will increase from
the current US$2,6 billion to US$10,2 billion over the next ten years, while that of category B
municipalities will increase from US$2,7 billion to US$ 7,5 billion. Using equation 5 to get the
intertemporal n-period budget constraint, Table 6 shows that in the case of metros, the debt/GVA
ratio will have to decline by an average of 9 percent per annum while municipalities will have to lower
their debt/GVA ratios by an average of 10 percent per annum. This would only be possible if the gap
between expenditure and revenue from own sources is narrowed. Thus, if ﬁscal policy implemented
by municipalities and metros does not allow for drastic changes from the current scenario, total local
government “debt” (discounting the 50 percent cap on the ﬁnancing of current expenditures) will
increase from the current US$5,3 billion to approximately US$17,5 billion over the next ten years.
85C o n c l u s i o n
The analysis shows that approximately one third of municipalities do not comply with the require-
ment that a “reasonable” amount of current expenditures be ﬁnanced by means of own resources.
Furthermore, a substantial variance could be detected as far as collection of own income is concerned.
Although the reason for this phenomenon has not been investigated, it is suspected that it has to do
with lack of skills and political will to be more reliant on own income. It also has to do with a his-
tory of dependence, and of bailouts by the national government due to “soft budget” policies. Fiscal
sustainability concerns highlight the importance of increasing the level of own resources, thereby
limiting deﬁcits and “debt”. The results show that if the subsidies and grants formula is adjusted
to a capped limit on grants for current expenditures, ﬁscal balances of local government ﬁnance in
South Africa could become unstable. Due to historical and political factors, local governments in
South Africa diﬀer substantially in terms of potential revenue base, but it is suggested that in many
instances the full potential of an own-revenue base is not fully exploited — an issue that should be
dealt with in the allocation-of-grants policy of the higher spheres of government.
In view of the mass protests by communities against poor service delivery, more and better-
quality services are needed, which require suﬃcient funding and sound ﬁnancial practices, so that
the sustainability of government ﬁnances at the national level is not jeopardised. Also, thriving
markets at the local government level require strong governance that protect property rights — strong
enough to conﬁscate some of the wealth of its citizens in order to do their job (Weingast: 1995, 1).
The performance of municipalities classiﬁed as “more successful” could serve as a benchmark for
setting criteria in terms of self-reliance; the equitable-share formula should be adjusted accordingly.
However, exactly how this adjustment should be made falls outside the scope of this paper and is
targeted as a follow-up research project.
The analysis in this paper should not be confused with arguments for or against ﬁscal decentral-
isation. It merely touches upon the importance of sound ﬁscal practices, which is but one aspect of
the debate about more or less decentralised government. What stands out is the diversity between
diﬀerent local authorities regarding self-reliance, which signals diﬀerences in competency and reﬂects
the diﬃculty of ﬁnding a suﬃcient number of skilled oﬃcials at the third sphere of governance. Also
apparent is evidence of patronage, in which skilled oﬃcials are overlooked in favour of more politi-
cally connected candidates. In this regard the merit of sustaining an institutional framework with
too many municipalities not performing according to minimum standards from a ﬁnancial point of
view, raises the question whether at least some of them should be incorporated within other more
successful constituencies.
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10Table 1: Municipalities (category B) collecting more than 15 per 





GVA Population No. Municipality
%Revenue/
GVA Population
1 Kungwini 0.588 94,047              24 Saldanha Bay 0.182 60,960             
2 Greater Kokstad 0.584 40,409              25 Ngwathe 0.180 138,178           
3 Overstrand 0.314 45,220              26 Msunduzi 0.179 631,121           
4 Senqu 0.282 145,647            27 uMuziwabantu 0.178 89,030             
5 Moshaweng 0.278 108,010            28 Abaqulusi 0.175 200,493           
6 Maluti-a-Phofung 0.276 407,124            29 Musina 0.173 42,145             
7 Mossel Bay 0.268 67,452              30 Mthonjaneni 0.173 43,114             
8 Umtshezi 0.265 57,848              31 Dannhauser 0.171 110,846           
9 Plettenberg Bay 0.264 26,608              32 uPhongolo 0.171 115,550           
10 Kouga 0.252 70,362              33 Mogalakwena 0.171 318,506           
11 Polokwane 0.246 517,398            34 Potchefstroom 0.161 128,735           
12 KwaDukuza 0.233 169,164            35 Buffalo City 0.156 803,448           
13 Blue Crane Route 0.231 37,621              36 //Khara Hais 0.156 83,164             
14 Maquassi Hills 0.213 66,440              37 Dihlabeng 0.154 123,212           
15 uMngeni 0.209 71,997              38 Emfuleni 0.153 830,416           
16 Langeberg 0.208 41,641              39 Mogale City 0.152 244,013           
17 George 0.206 125,563            40 Umsobomvu 0.152 27,680             
18 Laingsburg 0.202 6,302                41 Mutale 0.152 93,815             
19 Ndlambe 0.197 53,735              42 Knysna 0.151 45,460             
20 Endumeni 0.196 51,064              43 Breede River/Winelands 0.151 74,632             
21 Elundini 0.191 130,777           
22 Sakhisizwe 0.185 68,936             
23 Mpofana 0.183 32,045             
Source: MTEF 2009/10 National Treasury with own calculations  
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Table 2: Municipalities (category B) funding in excess of 50 per cent of their 
current expenditures by means of grants and subsidies 
No  Municipality  %  No  Municipality  % 
1  Kagisano  1.652  55  Nkonkobe  0.72 
2  Mhlontlo  1.332  56  Kwa Sani  0.717 
3  Naledi (Fs)  1.285  57  Setsoto  0.715 
4  Molopo  1.248  58  Greater Giyani  0.711 
5  Mbhashe  1.195  59  Mohokare  0.709 
6  Thembisile  1.181  60  Mnquma  0.699 
7  Okhahlamba  1.161  61  Impendle  0.687 
8  Mbizana  1.141  62  Nkomazi  0.686 
9  King Sabata Dalind  1.104  63  Dr. J. S. Moroka  0.682 
10  Ndwedwe  1.096  64  Mafube  0.680 
11  Nquthu  1.088  65  Amahlathi  0.676 
12  Khai-Ma  1.071  66  Port St Johns  0.666 
13  Maphumulo  1.063  67  Maruleng  0.665 
14  Lepelle-Nkumpi  1.053  68  Elundini  0.660 
15  Ngqushwa  1.014  69  Moses Kotane  0.659 
16  Indaka  0.999  70  Nala  0.655 
17  Emalahleni (Ec)  0.990  71  Phumelela  0.653 
18  Thulamela  0.989  72  Intsika Yethu  0.648 
19  Imbabazane  0.985  73  Bushbuckridge  0.647 
20  Nyandeni  0.982  74  The Big Five False Bay  0.647 
21  Engcobo  0.980  75  Matatiele  0.632 
22  Ntabankulu  0.954  76  Sakhisizwe  0.631 
23  Umzumbe  0.948  77  Renosterberg  0.626 
24  Umhlabuyalingana  0.946  78  Albert Luthuli  0.607 
25  Blouberg  0.92  79  Kgetlengrivier  0.605 
26  Ezingolweni  0.915  80  uMuziwabantu  0.601 
27  Nkandla  0.912  81  Greater Tubatse  0.599 
28  Mamusa  0.901  82  Ulundi  0.593 
29  Moretele  0.898  83  Tswelopele  0.585 
30  Msinga  0.895  84  eDumbe  0.583 
12No  Municipality  %  No  Municipality  % 
31  Umzimkhulu  0.892  85  Greater Marble Hall  0.577 
32  Fetakgomo  0.889  86  Greater Taung  0.575 
33  Tokologo  0.869  87  Tsolwana  0.566 
34  Ratlou  0.866  88  Magareng  0.564 
35  Nongoma  0.841  89  Elias Motsoaledi  0.563 
36  Ingwe  0.825  90  Mthonjaneni  0.562 
37  Aganang  0.822  91  Nketoana  0.559 
38  Jozini  0.816  92  Sundays River Valley  0.558 
39  Makhudutamaga  0.812  93  Ikwezi  0.555 
40  Mkhambathini  0.811  94  Ntambanana  0.554 
41  Koukamma  0.807  95  Kopanong  0.552 
42  Hlahisa  0.807  96  Masilonyama  0.546 
43  Molemole  0.807  97  Merafong City  0.546 
44  Mogalakwena  0.801  98  Greater Letaba  0.541 
45  Mbonambi  0.798  99  Dikgatlong  0.541 
46  Richmond  0.792  100  Baviaans  0.526 
47  Umdoni  0.787  101  uPongolo  0.525 
48  Mier  0.781  102  Umsobomvu  0.520 
49  Ikheis  0.771  103  Umvoti  0.517 
50  Great Kei  0.756  104  Moshaweng  0.513 
51  Vulamehlo  0.751  105  Prince Albert  0.510 
52  Inkwanca  0.749  106  Dipaleseng  0.508 
53  Qaukeni  0.746  107  Nxuba  0.507 




            Source: MTEF S009/10 National Teasury with own calculations 
 
 
13Table 3: Municipalities funding less than 20 per cent of current 





Top 21 No. Municipality %
Included in 
Treasury's 
Top 21 Treasury Top 21
1 Bitou 19.3% 28 Randfontein 13.5% Buffalo City
2 Matjhabeng 19.3% 29 Naledi (Nw) 12.7% City Of Matlosana
3 Lesedi 19.1% 30 Cape Agulhas 12.3% Drakenstein
4 Hibiscus Coast 18.9% 31 Potchefstroom 12.1% Emalahleni (Mp)
5 Bela Bela 18.7% 32 Ba-Phalaborwa 11.6% Emfuleni
6 Ndlambe 18.3% 33 Breede River Winelands 11.6% George
7 Matzikama 18.1% 34 Endumeni 11.2% Madibeng
8 Oudtshoorn 18.1% 35 Saldanha Bay 11.1% Mangaung
9 Maletswai 17.9% 36 Sol Plaatje 10.6% Yes Mbombela
10 Cederberg 17.7% 37 Steve Tshwete 10.5% Yes Msunduzi
11 Theewaterskloof 17.7% 38 Kouga 9.9% Polokwane
12 Mpofana 17.6% 39 uMhlathuze 9.6% Yes Rustenburg
13 City Of Matlosana 17.3% Yes 40 Tswaing 9.5% Sol Plaatje
14 Lekwa 17.0% 41 Msunduzi 9.3% Yes Stellenbosch
15 Mangaung 16.9% Yes 42 Govan Mbeki 9.2% Steve Tshwete
16 Metsimaholo 16.7% 43 Swartland 7.0% uMhlathuze
17 Msukaligwa 16.4% 44 Drakenstein 5.3% Yes
18 Umtshezi 16.2% 45 Overstrand 4.6%
19 Breede Valley 15.5% 46 Swellendam 4.2%
20 Rustenburg 15.4% Yes 47 Ubuhlebezwe 3.7%
21 Dihlabeng 15.2% 48 KwaDukuza 2.1%
22 Moshaweng 15.1% 49 Emalahleni (Mp) 1.5% Yes
23 Abaqulusi 14.7% 50 Stellenbosch 0.9% Yes
24 Witzenberg 14.7% 51
25 Mossel Bay 14.3% 52
26 George 14.2% Yes 53
27 Senqu 13.6% 54
Source: MTEF 2009/10 National Treasury with own calculations
 
14Table 4: The contribution of each of the identified sources of  
revenue relative to total revenue 
Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
prate  208  0.12222  0.08992  0  0.60183 
srate  208  0.35388  0.22399  0  0.856707 
grate  208  0.36768  0.27249  0  0.98377 







1 Knysna 4,881                     488                         
2 Bitou 4,559                     547                         
3 George 4,259                     425                         
4 Drakenstein 4,059                     310                         
5 Mogale City 3,988                     347                         
6 Mossel Bay 3,817                     544                         
7 Potchefstroom 3,559                     350                         
8 Mangaung 3,031                     246                         
9 Breede River Winelands 3,030                     315                         
10 Hessequa 2,843                     266                         
11 Kouga 2,517                     339                         
12 Randfontein 2,508                     224                         
13 Emfuleni 2,275                     223                         
14 Westonaria 2,270                     177                         
15 Buffalo City 2,238                     192                         
16 Beaufort West 2,198                     174                         
17 Laingsburg 2,109                     166                         
18 Camdeboo 1,934                     146                         
19 Emthanjeni 1,922                     159                         
20 Matjhabeng 1,867                     144                         
21 Inxuba Yethemba 1,776                     147                         
22 Polokwane 1,609                     123                         
23 Blue Crane Route 1,546                     192                         
24 Ndlambe 1,528                     185                         
25 Dipaleseng 1,416                     107                         
26 Mantsopa 1,405                     117                         
27 Prince Albert 1,309                     122                         
28 Ngwathe 1,131                     145                         
29 Nala 1,108                     114                         
30 Maquassi Hills 1,055                     102                         
31 Umsobomvu 1,030                     121                         
32 Maluti-a-Phofung 707                        62                           
33 Mogalakwena 523                        59                           
34 Sakhisizwe 491                        60                           
Table 5a: Municipalities "more successful" in generating 




Gross value added per 
capita dollar
Revenue per capita 
dollar 
1 Cape Agulhas 4,445                                       294                                        
2 eThekwini 4,419                                       295                                        
3 Nelson Mandela Bay 3,751                                       266                                        
4 Sol Plaatje 3,334                                       245                                        
5 Witzenberg 3,323                                       235                                        
6 Oudtshoorn 3,154                                       217                                        
7 Umjindi 2,752                                       184                                        
8 Delmas 2,741                                       187                                        
9 Naledi 2,506                                       185                                        
10 Makana 2,347                                       158                                        
11 Lekwa-Teemane 2,263                                       160                                        
12 Modimolle 2,093                                       133                                        
13 Renosterberg 1,757                                       107                                        
14 Emakhazeni 1,733                                       115                                        
15 Kopanong 1,594                                       118                                        
16 Phokwane 1,495                                       92                                          
17 Lukhanji 1,352                                       99                                          
18 Setsoto 1,292                                       81                                          
19 Magareng 1,203                                       85                                          
20 Nketoana 1,164                                       75                                          
21 Greater Tzaneen 947                                         65                                          
22 Makhado 751                                         50                                          
Table 5b: Municipalities classified as "marginally successful" in collecting own 
revenue









1 Swellendam 4,624                        239                             
2 Swartland 4,311                        243                             
3 Cederberg 4,211                        189                             
4 Breede Valley 4,139                        223                             
5 Tsantsabane 3,706                        153                             
6 Merafong City 3,644                        163                             
7 Bergrivier 3,514                        174                             
8 Karoo Hoogland 3,494                        103                             
9 Matzikama 3,444                        182                             
10 Theewaterskloof 3,380                        154                             
11 Lephalale 3,144                        89                               
12 Hantam 3,099                        111                             
13 Lekwa 3,074                        170                             
14 Thaba Chweu 3,034                        142                             
15 Kannaland 2,744                        152                             
16 Thembelihle 2,740                        160                             
17 City Of Matlosana 2,668                        139                             
18 Msukaligwa 2,415                        123                             
19 Ditsobotla 2,395                        61                               
20 Mbombela 2,298                        87                               
21 Masilonyana 2,171                        73                               
22 Kareeberg 2,085                        116                             
23 Ventersdorp 1,919                        107                             
24 Letsemeng 1,899                        60                               
25 Siyathemba 1,794                        97                               
26 Lesedi 1,791                        95                               
27 Ikwezi 1,706                        57                               
28 Ubuntu 1,705                        76                               
29 Seme 1,660                        58                               
30 Madibeng 1,539                        25                               
31 Gariep 1,532                        75                               
32 Baviaans 1,506                        72                               
33 Tswelopele 1,473                        39                               
34 Mamusa 1,473                        82                               
35 Sundays River Valley 1,422                        46                               
36 Dikgatlong 1,377                        69                               
37 Mafube 1,368                        77                               
38 Mkhondo 1,120                        61                               
39 Ramotshere Moiloa 861                           38                               
40 Phumelela 787                           41                               
41 Tokologo 731                           38                               
42 Tswaing 715                           24                               
43 Nkomazi 675                           20                               
44 Albert Luthuli 625                           19                               
45 Elias Motsoaledi 625                           18                               
46 Tsolwana 542                           21                               
47 Greater Marble Hall 502                           25                               
48 Blouberg 496                           7                                 
49 Greater Letaba 367                           10                               
50 Senqu 336                           17                               
51 Elundini 291                           11                               
Table 5c: Municipalities classified as "less successful" in 
collecting revenue
Source: Own calculations  
 
17Table 6: Inter-temporal analysis of the growth in debt: 2009/10 – 
2019/20 
  t 
t   t tb







bt  Diffbt*bt 
Metros             
2010/11  2.5  0.963      9.402   5.900  5.903   
2019/20  0.5  0.928      8.945   0.472  0.47  -10.11 
Category B             
2010/11  0.8  0.983  10.194  5.84  5.84   
2019/20  1.7  1.003  10.401  0.49  0.49  -10.86 
 
Table 7: Model results of the Municipal Revenue/GVA ratios   
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: lrev  
Number of Observations Read  113 
Number of observations used  113 
 
Analysis of variance 




F value  Pr > F 
Model  1  60.92403  60.92403  127.29  <.0001 
Error  111  53.12549  0.47861       
Corrected Total  112  114.04952          
 
Root MSE  0.69182  R-Square  0.5342 
Dependent Mean  6.82743  Adj R-Sq  0.5300 
18Coeff Var  10.13287       
 
Parameter estimates 




t Value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept  1  -3.64063  0.93010  -3.91  0.0002 
lgva  1  1.08794  0.09643  11.28  <.0001 
 
The REG procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent variable: lrev  
Number of Observations Read  19 
Number of Observations Used  19 
 
Analysis of variance 




F Value  Pr > F 
Model  1  1.20808  1.20808  3.11  0.0959 
Error  17  6.61072  0.38887       
Corrected Total  18  7.81880          
 
Root MSE  0.62359  R-square  0.1545 
Dependent mean  7.69744  Adj R-Sq  0.1048 
Coeff var  8.10128       
 
Parameter estimates 




t Value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept  1  17.45333  5.53687  3.15  0.0058 
19Parameter estimates 




t Value  Pr > |t| 
lgva  1  -0.88132  0.50002  -1.76  0.0959 
 
Figure  1:  Plot  of  the  logarithm  of  per  capita  revenue  by  the 
logarithm  of  per  capita  gross  value  added  by 
municipality
 
Figure 2:  Plot of revenue/GVA ratios of municipalities  
   
20Figure 3: The spread of municipalities categorized in terms of 
revenue/GVA ratios 
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